The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations

CRS Report Since The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations. R48971. June 3, 2026. February 2026, U.S./Israel-Iran conflict in the Persian Gulf region and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz to most shipping have presented fundamental risks to the security and economic vitality of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Thousands of attacks on facilities hosting U.S. forces and critical infrastructure locations across the GCC countries during this period have demonstrated the Arab Gulf states’ vulnerability to threats from neighboring Iran and Iran-aligned regional armed groups. GCC member state responses to the 2026 conflict have differed, while each state has condemned attacks on its respective territory. The UAE, having faced the most attacks of any GCC state, has adopted a defiant and forceful posture toward Iran. Saudi Arabia has called for de-escalation and has promoted Pakistan-based peace talks, while asserting its right to self-defense. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly have conducted strikes on Iran, the UAE reportedly has welcomed direct Israeli defense aid, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly have struck Iran-linked targets in Iraq. Other GCC states have thwarted attacks, Qatar and Oman have promoted diplomatic engagement, and Qatar has hosted Iranian officials for mediation talks…U.S. policies and Gulf state choices may affect U.S. security, diplomatic, and economic interests in the Gulf region and beyond. Congress may examine whether or how the conflict will shape U.S. basing and force posture plans and Gulf country support for the hosting of U.S. forces or the use of their territory, waters, and airspace for U.S. operations. Congress may be asked to consider new arms sales to Gulf countries and may evaluate the implications of any Gulf country decisions to diversify sources of defense imports or expand local production of defense technologies. Congress may also assess the Gulf states’ responses to U.S. requests that they recognize and normalize their relationships with Israel in connection with any U.S. negotiated agreement with Iran. The Gulf states may evaluate any U.S.-Iran agreement relative to their security interests, views on nuclear issues, and an agreement’s effects on maritime transit in the Strait of Hormuz. Congress may evaluate the implications of any resulting accord or divisions between the GCC states, any new or expanded partnerships among the Gulf States, or any new initiatives between them and extra-regional actors, including Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and countries in South Asia, Africa, East Asia, and Europe.

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